



SECRET

TALKING PAPER

IG/CM ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY

BACKGROUND:

- [This study, together with the companion study done by the Interagency Group on Counterintelligence, constitutes the second and final phase of the Executive Branch's response to NSDD 2-82, which called for a review of the policies, capabilities and organization of the Government to detect and counter the threat posed by hostile intelligence collection.] A

- This study has done something that has not been done before. It has surveyed all of the Government's countermeasures programs from an organizational standpoint. These include the more general programs with which you are all familiar; security classification, personnel security, and physical security measures, as well as those more narrowly focussed programs of which there is less appreciation, such as those that provide us warning of hostile intelligence collectors, and those that protect our ports and airways.] A

- If one takes the time to read the report, or even the Executive Summary, a number of things become apparent:

-- our program is overall a comprehensive one: we came across no evidence of hostile collection threats that were not being addressed in some manner within the Government;

-- there are many disparate elements involved, ranging from the Coast Guard to the Office of Personnel Management;

-- there is no overall management of U.S. countermeasures, nor does one appear feasible or desirable;

-- there are facets of these programs, however, that would probably benefit from uniform policies and procedures where none exist now, and from greater interagency coordination;

-- there may also be advantages in looking at these programs as a whole in terms of assessing where resources should be placed, and in what priority. Very little of this sort of analysis is performed today. Indeed, for some of these countermeasures programs, one finds that resources are not apportioned specifically in support of such functions. Thus, one has a difficult situation at the outset in even identifying those resources that should be increased or reduced in the interests of improving overall security.

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- Some of the countermeasures described in the report are undertaken primarily for other than countermeasures purposes: for example, the warning mechanisms discussed in the report are used primarily for warning of hostile military actions against the United States, but they also provide warning of the presence of potential intelligence-gathering platforms.

- Other of the programs described in the study are focussed on how we deal with particular types of hostile collection threats as opposed to the more general measures we take to protect classified information from disclosure.

- The recommendations contained in the study do not, for the most part, dictate immediate change. They do, however, provide the IG/CM and SIG(I) with an ample agenda to guide many of our future efforts. In short, as the report states, it should be taken as the start, not the conclusion of a continuing process to improve the security posture of the Government.